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Paper 7: An interdisciplinary approach and framework for dealing with security 
 breaches and organizational recovery.  
 Peter R.J. Trim, Yang-Im Lee and David Weston. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper takes into account the work undertaken by Winsberg (2003), Yao et al., (2005), 
van der Aalst and Stahl (2011), and Thomas et al., (2013). It represents an attempt at studying 
the effect of an information breach, how an organization recovers from an attack and also, 
how management can estimate the cost of an attack in terms of resources, lost income and 
future investments in recovery related expenditures. We concur with the view of Thomas et 
al., (2013, p.2) and accept that more needs to be done with respect to developing methods and 
frameworks that assist the closure of the gap between academic research and professional 
practice. The objective of this paper is therefore, to explain how managers in an organization 
can estimate the cost of a potential security breach and make a case to senior management for 
additional resources that assist the repair and recovery stage. We assume, therefore, that a 
breach will occur and that by investing resources in the recovery stage, the organization will 
be able to continue functioning. We assume that managers within the organization will, by 
referencing the incident in the organization’s risk register, be transparent about a potential 
impact and its consequences, and will share information with other organizations in the 
industry and elsewhere. It is our ultimate intention to produce a virtual cyber security 
emergency planning simulation that can train cyber security professionals and those 
undertaking a training and/or educational programme in the area of cyber security. 
 
 
Scenario exercises 
 
It is our intention to add to the academic literature highlighting the importance of scenario 
planning, for example, Yao et al., (2005, p.1645) are right to suggest that: “Through scenarios 
we can prioritize the opportunities or threats and put our scarce and valuable resources to 
producing the greatest return”. This statement has implications for management and we 
intend to make clear the fact that by adopting a pro-active approach to cyber security 
problems, management can think less about the “what if” factors and more about the 
contingencies that need to be in place to stop an impact having a detrimental effect on a 
company. Another point to take into account when engaging in modelling of any kind, is that 
a business intelligence system (van der Aalst and Stahl, 2011, p.11): “provides tools to 
analyze the performance-that is, the efficiency and effectiveness-of running business 
processes”. It is envisaged that the research referred to in this paper will add to the body of 
knowledge relating to how modelling is used to facilitate decision-making in complex 
situations.  As regards the benefits associated with simulations, Winsberg (2003, p.116) has 
suggested that “Simulation is a technique that begins with well-established theoretical 
principles, and through a carefully crafted process, creates new descriptions of the systems 
governed by those principles. It is a technique that, when properly used, will provide 
information about systems for which previous experimental Data is 
scare.……………………………..Furthermore, simulations often yield sanctioned and 
reliable new knowledge of systems…………”      
  
Yao et al., (2005, p.1644) acknowledge that: “Simulation is probably the most widely used 
and the most effective method to train emergency management workers. Its fidelity can create 
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tensions and stimulate emotions similar to real emergency/disasters”. There are two types of 
simulation. The real world version such as “Operation Waking Shark 2” (where UK banks 
were subject to a simulated attack) and the type of simulation we shall do using, the petri-nets 
where we attempt to model certain aspects of the information security process. A virtual 
simulation has a number of advantages associated with it, for example, according to Yao et 
al., (2005, pp.1644-1645) it can be considered (i) flexible (various emergency/disaster 
situations can be incorporated); (ii) easy to deliver (those involved can be based anywhere 
and only need a personal computer, to be connected to the Internet, and a groupware server 
package); (iii) promote collaborative learning, as the on-line learning environment can 
facilitate, through interaction,  deep thinking, as well as critical and creative thinking. 
  
 
Theoretical framework and conceptual approach 
 
The focus of attention is how managers in an organization establish that a potential cyber 
attack launched on an organization will cause harm and how resources for the recovery 
period can be committed so that the organization is able to carry out a full repair and continue 
in business. We assume that the impact on the organization is insufficient to put it out of 
business for a long period of time and assume that the organization will be fully operational 
within 24 hours. Should the breach be more harmful than expected, it is envisaged that the 
company will be unable to operate for 48 hours; and if it is considered a really devastating 
attack, the company will be unable to trade for 36 hours or longer. From a financial point of 
view, we estimate that the cost of not operating for 24 hours (wages, insurance, lost business 
for example) is referred to as LB (loss in business) and denoted as LB-1, and for subsequent 
days is LB-2, LB-3 etc. If the cost of a data breach is £100 per record, then if 1,000 records 
are effected, the cost would be 1,000 x £100 = £100,000 times 2 days represents £200,000 
and three days would represent £300,000. This cost is not we consider unreasonable although 
we accept that it is higher than other estimates reported (House of Commons, 2012, p.6).   
 
We accept that research related to recovery and restoration underpins resilience planning 
(Thomas et al., 2013, p.9) and it is our intention to provide an interactive framework so that 
managers within an organization communicate with each other in order to rectify a problem 
as soon as possible.  For example, we have used the following weighting factor: c 
(communication) is excellent and rated C1. When communication is poor, we assume that 
there is a 24 hour delay in a message being transmitted so therefore, C+24, is represented by 
C+0.24 (weighting factor) and for a 48 hours delay we use C+0.48 and for three days we use 
C+0.60 for example. If we accept that cyber attacks are increasing in intensity and 
sophistication, it is possible to include in the equation an extra element, namely the cost of 
buying in expertise and assistance. For example, a ‘light’ impact which causes limited 
disruption means that the organization’s cyber security defences are reasonably robust, 
however, a devastating impact allows us to assume that the organization’s cyber security 
defence system is ineffective in which case the in-house cyber security knowledge and 
capability is deemed to be poor and the company has to buy in knowledge and expertise from 
specialist providers. We denote this in the following way: CSP (cyber security provision) can 
be rated as poor, adequate or satisfactory. This can be interpreted at levels, for example, CSP 
3(poor) and a high need represents a weighting factor of 0.3; CSP 2 (adequate) represents a 
weighting of 0.2; and CSP 1 (satisfactory) represents a weighting of 0.1. It is possible to 
quantify these weightings in terms of cost: poor represents an immediate investment in cyber 
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security services of £75,000; adequate  represents an immediate investment in cyber security 
services of £50,000; and satisfactory  represents an immediate investment in cyber security 
services of £25,000.           
 
With reference to the case example outlined below, we can assume the reputational damage 
to the company was 15% of its share value. Therefore, we need to include in the above 
equation a weighting factor of 0.15 loss in company value which can be interpreted as a 
multiplier of 0.15. Should this be the case, it is possible that shareholders will divest their 
shares in the company because they consider that the company’s shares will deteriorate 
further.  Hence we assume that one shareholder will sell their shares in the company and as a 
result, the share price will fall by another 5 per cent. We include this in the calculation as an 
additional multiplier of 0.05. So reputational damage is estimated at 20% of the share value 
of the company or 0.20.  
 
As regards quantifying the share value, it can be noted that the day before the incident the 
share price of the company stood at £20; therefore, on day 1 of the incident, the share value 
represented £17 and day 2 witnessed a decrease of an additional 5%, so the actual value of 
the shares would be £16.15 each representing a decrease of £3.85 or 19.25% from the day 
before the incident.  
 
Owing to the fact that companies do not operate in isolation and have a number of 
interdependent relationships with other companies, and are part of a network of 
organizations, it can be assumed that there is a risk that the company that has sustained a 
cyber attack will lose future business as customer organizations consider that the staff in the 
company are untrustworthy if they do not communicate the depth of the problem at the 
earliest opportunity. For example, if on day one management within the company attacked 
keep quiet (do not inform customer organizations, financiers (banks) and suppliers for 
example), the risk associated with these stakeholder organizations terminating business links 
with the company is considered to be low (e.g., a weighing of 0.10 is assigned). However, 
once rumours spread or matters become public the risk that the stakeholder organizations will 
terminate business with the affected company increases from low to medium risk (e.g., 2 to 3 
days and a weighting of 0.2 to 0.3). By day 4 a high risk is recorded. From day four onwards 
a weighting of 0.4 is recorded because it is assumed that after day 4 the risk will become 
constant because it is not in the interest of anybody to terminate the business relationship by 
then.      
 
 
Case example. The branching or cascading effect.     
 
The IT Manager, had discovered that the company's marketing data base had been penetrated 
by a competitor and that staff in the competitor organization had been stealing data from the 
company. This was not unusual because a report in a national newspaper had indicated 
several cases of hacking in association with customer client lists. In some cases, it was the 
result of insider action. For example, in one case, two employees working for the same 
company had taken a manager’s password and entered and downloaded sensitive company 
data from one of the subsidiary organizations working in the area of government contracts 
and the same company had been subject to several hacking attacks from a private company 
that was known to be stealing sensitive data for resale. 
 
A competitor had also been attacked at some stage or been associated with one or several 
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attacks, and had started a rumour about the market leader resulting in the company’s market 
share value falling by 15% in a single day. Following an internal inquiry, it was clear that the 
data that was hacked related to: 
 
1. data regarding suppliers (e.g., types of contract awarded, penalty clauses and prices paid 
for example); 
2. information about the company's new product development process (e.g., a specific 3D 
printing technology and intellectual property); and 
3. information about the online customer-finance department payment system. 
 
It seemed that large blocks of data relating to existing customers  had been obtained (so the 
competitor could offer better price deals) and establish what type of risk was involved (e.g., 
this would result in improved risk assessment and risk analysis). In addition, the data 
obtained relating to the company's new product development process would allow the 
competitor to circumvent the company's main patent and/or identify the next generation of 
the technology/application. An internal investigation had also unearthed the fact that some 
staff had been actively involved in exchanging information with unknown individuals on 
social websites and as a result two junior members of staff in the organization’s design 
department had been enticed into giving away sensitive data. 
 
The inquiry undertaken by senior managers and the corporate security team within the 
organization, revealed that the company’s website had been infected with malware and those 
downloading a company brochure had had their details sent secretly to the competitor so 
potential customers could be easily targeted. This was most disturbing and it was necessary 
for the legal team to be consulted vis-à-vis possible legal action against the company.  Three 
months prior to this set of events, the IT manager had been asked to undertake a security 
review of the company’s computer systems and networks and an internal report, sent to the 
company’s board had indicated that: 
 
"The IT manager had been asked to undertake an audit of the company's computer 
system and network but was reluctant to talk with staff in other departments 
(especially marketing and finance) because they could not understand the technical 
aspects of the proposed work. Several influential and knowledgeable people had 
been excluded from the work because they were either disliked by the IT manager 
or were thought to have limited intellectual capability and were thought not to be 
able to understand what was going on. This being the case, it was thought that some 
staff would not be able to contribute to the study.  
 
On one occasion, the marketing research manager was required to purchase data 
from an outside market research agency but refused to inform the IT manager about 
where the data was stored as they were not on speaking terms. It is believed the 
data was stored with a cloud provider but no record existed of what data or indeed 
other company data was stored in the cloud”.   
 
Additional evidence of mismanagement was also outlined in the report: 
 
“The Marketing Manager informed his boss, the Marketing Director, that one of 
the company's suppliers, had informed him, via their Managing Director, that they 
had heard that they were offering their top suppliers (those with 20% of their 
business (category A supplier)) a financial incentive to lower costs and gain more 
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business. This was a surprise to the Marketing Manager because this had only 
been discussed internally by several senior managers, the Marketing Director and 
the Finance Director. It seems that either one of the category A suppliers had 
leaked the information or the teleconferencing facility had been hacked into and 
rumours circulated for a deliberate reason”. 
 
The report continued: 
 
“This sensitive information or the ability of other suppliers to influence 
negotiations, was crucial as there was a shakeout in the industry and price cutting 
had taken hold. The effect would possibly be that lower prices would have to be 
set; profit margins would be lower, and more emphasis would be placed on 
promotion and advertising to gain more customers to offset the reduced 
profitability”. 
 
The minutes of a meeting held to discuss the findings of the report suggested that: 
 
“The consequences for the marketing department were: 
confidential and sensitive data had already been leaked; 
once prices fell it would be difficult to increase them again; 
the public relations department would have to work harder and faster, and would 
have to embrace digital marketing campaigns to get the appropriate message out 
to customers and end users faster. 
 
The implications for security were: 
either somebody within the company or somebody within a supplier organization 
was leaking information; 
the company's marketing data base had been penetrated; 
company passwords had been intercepted; 
a contractor may have stolen and sold sensitive data; 
company representatives  or supplier representatives  had attended a venue that 
was electronically bugged; 
a third party (bank) may have released information or a wholesaler or retailer may 
have done so; and 
a competitor may have deliberately started a rumour to gain insights and 
information about the company and its relationships with it suppliers”. 
 
In addition, those attending the meeting that had discussed the issues and challenges resulting 
were convinced that: 
 “A new information security policy and strategy was needed. 
A risk manager needed to be appointed. 
A risk mitigation strategy was needed. 
The company needed to establish a risk register. 
A new model of risk management was needed. 
The marketing supplier data base needed to be patched”. 
 
The report made known the following: 
 
“It became clear from a board meeting held earlier in the month that the initial 
report had raised concerns among senior management with respect to how the 
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scenario would unfold, and also, how mechanisms could be put in place to 
produce a receptive and sympathetic organizational culture that resulted in cyber 
security management processes being implemented that would change the 
organizational culture for the better. The following question had been posed: How 
would the scenario play out?” 
 
The head of corporate security had stated at the time:  
 
“Some of the actions outlined will in actual fact have a very negative impact on 
the company. What worries me more than anything, is how can we square the 
marketing situation and ensure that the security consequences do not snowball out 
of control”. 
 
A background company report had been produced one year earlier and had made interesting 
reading: 
 
“A small company with 50 employees and 5 directors. Managing Director, 
Marketing Director, Finance Director, Human Resource Management Director 
and Technology Director. There was a marketing manager, a marketing research 
manager, a marketing data base manager, a finance manager, an IT manager, a 
personnel manager, a technology manager and a research and development 
manager. The main workforce was employed in marketing and sales work. 
Immediate problems facing the company were: 
 
Known threats 
 
Two non-information security threats were: competitor companies were 
increasing their market share by (1) introducing new products (4 in the last 12 
months) and (2) price cutting (which was attracting price sensitive customers). 
 
Unknown threats 
 
A criminal group had attempted to hack directly into the company's bank account 
to steal money from the company. A son of one of the mangers was downloading 
games from the Internet on his father's laptop computer which the manager used 
to take to work and download files and then take them home to work on at the 
weekend. 
 
A new cleaning company had been hired and one of the cleaners had been paid by 
a competitor to try and steal a data stick from the company and other information 
(eg., financial data reports and design work) that was left openly available and 
unguarded by staff after they finished work for the day. 
 
As well as this, the company was facing a law suit over non-payment of an 
account, because they said they had not received delivery of a component. When 
looked into, it was discovered that the component had been signed for by 
somebody within the company, but the signature did not match a current 
employee. It was possibly a casual worker employed by the company during a 
temporary period of high demand and the person(s) no longer worked at the 
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company. News of this had got out and some existing customers had not renewed 
their business contracts (e.g., reputational damage). 
 
The marketing director and the finance director had been in discussions with a 
potential collaborator and had mistakenly provided them (via an email) with the 
blue print of a new technology the company was developing. The company 
concerned said that they had deleted the material as a matter of policy but this 
could not be verified. 
 
It was known that one of the company's suppliers was regularly being subject to 
power shortages and the electricity supply to the company was disrupted two to 
three times per month. On one occasion the product produced and shipped to the 
company was faulty and this had raised concerns that the supplier was not 
carrying out quality checks. But the company in question had not invested in 
sufficient quality control (both internally (products made or assembled in-house) 
and externally (those bought in from external suppliers). 
 
Owing to the fact that the company's sales were declining and the profit margins 
were being squeezed, rumours had started to surface that the company would go 
bust and because of this two experienced staff members had left the company and 
taken up work with other companies. They had taken knowledge about the 
company and its management procedures with them. 
 
The company's information security system was dated and the manuals relating to 
the system had been misplaced.  
 
The finance director and his staff undertook risk management but did not talk with 
staff in other departments. The risk analysis model was statistical in nature and 
was not that well understand by some managers. 
 
Company staff had not adhered to any industry standard and managed as they 
considered relevant. There was an ad hoc approach to problem solving and the 
common message was: "If it is okay leave it. If it is broken fix it. Do not fix it 
until it is broken". 
 
The IT manager had read about the cloud and said that the company should 
outsource to a cloud provider the human resource management capability of the 
company. It was reported that the personal records of staff may be at risk and then 
staff and the organization would be vulnerable. The IT manager said it should be 
okay because the cloud provider could take responsibility for managing the 
situation and they must be responsible for everybody's data”. 
 
Recommendation: Research needs to be undertaken to explain how a virtual cyber security 
emergency planning simulation can be used to train cyber security professionals and those 
undertaking a training and/or educational programme in the area of cyber security. 
 
A framework for information security modelling 
 
A Petri net is a mathematical modelling tool that has a simple graphical representation. 
Within the context of security Petri nets have been used in diverse number of ways, ranging 
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from modelling of cyber-physical attacks on smart grids (Chen et al., 2011), to formal 
verification of security policies (Huang and Kirchner (2011). We propose to build an 
information security framework using Petri nets and we provide herewith a brief description 
of Petri nets before we introduce our framework. 
 
A brief introduction to Petri nets 
 
A Petri net can be conveniently described using its graphical representation (van der Aalst 
and Stahl (2011). Consider the simple Petri net is shown in Figure 1. The circles denote 
places, inside some of the places there are dots, these are denoted tokens. Taken together, the 
places and the tokens represent the state of the Petri net.  The rectangles denote transitions; it 
is through the actions of these transitions that the Petri net state can evolve. 
 
Figure 1 A simple Petri net 
 
 
                                                                                                
Figure 2 (a) An active transition                                       (b) Petri net state after the transition 
has fired   
 
The arcs in the net are directed (they have arrows showing their direction) and these arcs only 
join a place to a transition (and vice versa). For each transition, we distinguish between 
places that are connected to it with arcs that are entering the transition (input places) and 
places connected with arcs exiting the transition (output places).  A transition that has at least 
one token in each of its input places may then fire. Firing a transition simply means 
subtracting one token from each of its input places and adding one token to each of its output 
places (Figure 2). 
 
From this simple local update rule sophisticated models may be built, which can model 
processes that involve concurrency and synchronization. However, there are limitations and a 
variety of extensions to the basic Petri net have been proposed. For our purpose, we propose 
to build the framework using a timed and coloured Petri net. This type of net extends the 
concept of tokens such that they can contain information themselves. Timing allows us to 
model temporal processes. Indeed it is this type of Petri net that has been demonstrated to be 
useful for modelling business processes (van der Aalst and Stahl, 2011).  
 
The Petri net framework 
 
Figure 3 shows a representation of the proposed Petri net. Before describing the network in 
detail, there are two issues we wish to clarify.  First the boxes “A” through “E” are not 
transitions but entire petri nets, henceforth subnets. These subnets are plugged into the 
framework and must conform to certain constraints described below. Second, for technical 
reasons we would wish to have bi-directional arcs, this allows a subnet the flexibility to 
remove or replace tokens from input places. However, for ease of exposition we have used 
dashed arrows to represent these bi-directional arcs. The direction of each arrow allows the 
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reader to clearly see which places are considered inputs and which are considered outputs 
from each subnet.   
 
Figure 3 The Petri net Information Security Framework 
 
The subnet denoted “A” (near the top left of the network shown in Figure 3) has three input 
places: 
 
“Entities” contains (coloured) tokens representing all the possible targets (particular 
organisations, individuals, etc). Each token has at least a unique identifier, but will typically 
also contain a record of relevant information regarding the particular entity. 
 
Similarly the place denoted “Vulnerabilities” contains tokens relating to all forms of 
vulnerability, each token will have at least a unique identifier. 
 
Finally the place denoted “Attackers” contains tokens representing different possible 
attackers, each with a unique identifier. Maintaining the identity of an attacker throughout the 
framework is useful for modelling composite (attack tree) style attacks and for being able to 
introduce into the model the idea that different attackers will have different goals once they 
have compromised an asset.  
 
Subnet “A” produces new tokens, denoted attack tokens, which are a join of the Entity, 
Vulnerability and Attacker tokens, (for clarity we use a bold font to identify token types).  It 
is important to note that due to the Petri net’s ability to model concurrency; the output of 
subnet “A” can result in multiple tokens. Hence we can model multiple attacks on multiple 
entities that are all occurring simultaneously. The output tokens from subnet “A” enter the 
“Entities Attacked” place.  This place represents all the currently active attacks. 
 
Moving on to subnet “B”, the input places are “Entities Attacked” and “Controls”. The 
“Controls” place contains tokens representing each control that each entity currently has in 
place. Each control token will have a list of vulnerabilities it covers and a list of 
vulnerabilities it exposes, along with an identifier for the particular entity. It is the job of 
subnet “B” to determine if a control token exists that has an entity/covered vulnerability 
component that matches the entity/vulnerability component of the Attack token.  If an attack 
token is covered by a control token, then the attack token is moved into the “Attacks 
Neutralised” place. This particular place allows us to record all successfully defended attacks. 
If an attack token is not successfully covered by a control token, this means that the entity 
has been successfully compromised. The attack token is moved to the “Compromised” place. 
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The “Compromised” place is an input to the last three remaining subnets. We shall describe 
each of these subnets in turn.  
 
Subnet “E” returns information back to the attacker. At a minimum this can be the fact that 
the attack was successful, which is useful for modelling the ordering within attack trees. That 
is to say the attacker can initiate a further attack based on the success of the original attack(s). 
Subnet “C” is used to determine which assets are exposed given the set of successful attack 
tokens.  The output is an Asset Exposed token which contains an asset identifier and the 
relevant attack tokens. (The details regarding assets and the attacks required to expose them 
is part of the information recorded about an entity.) 
 
Finally subnet “D” models the ability to find and exploit and potentially deal with it, first by 
neutralising the attack and then by building new controls. It is worth noting that this process 
of security hardening need not be modelled independently for each entity. Information is 
typically shared between entities in order to speed up this process. 
 
By probing the state of the framework we can reason about variety of attack scenarios and 
responses. Cost models can be built on top of this framework by introducing additional 
information relating to costs such as the cost of exposure of each asset and the cost of 
maintaining a particular control. 
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